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Abstract
With the digital breakthrough, smart phones have become very essential com-
ponent for many routine tasks like shopping, paying bills, transferring money,
instant messaging, emails etc. Mobile devices are very attractive attack surface
for cyber thieves as they hold personal details (accounts, locations, contacts,
photos) and have potential capabilities for eavesdropping (with cameras/micro-
phone, wireless connections). Android, being the most popular, is the target of
malicious hackers who are trying to use Android app as a tool to break into and
control device. Android malware authors use many anti-analysis techniques to
hide from analysis tools. Academic researchers and commercial anti-malware
companies are putting great effort to detect such malicious apps. They are
making use of the combinations of static, dynamic and behavior based analysis
techniques.
Despite of all the security mechanisms provided by Android, apps can carry
out malicious actions through inter-app communication. One such inter-app
communication threats is collusion. In collusion malicious functionality is di-
vided across multiple apps. Each participating app accomplish its part and
communicate information to another app through Inter Component Communi-
cation (ICC). ICC does not require any special permissions. Also there is no
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compulsion to inform user about the communication. Each participating app
needs to request a minimal set of privileges, which may make it appear benign
to current state-of-the-art techniques that analyze one app at a time.
There are many surveys on app analysis techniques in Android; however
they focus on single-app analysis. This survey highlights several inter-app com-
munication threats, in particular collusion among multiple-apps. In this paper,
we present Android vulnerabilities that may be exploited for carrying privilege
escalation attacks, privacy leakage and collusion attacks. We cover the exist-
ing threat analysis, scenarios, and a detailed comparison of tools for intra and
inter-app analysis. To the best of our knowledge this is the first survey on inter-
app communication threats, app collusion and state-of-the-art detection tools
in Android.
Keywords: App Collusion, Privacy Leakage, Inter Component
Communication, Inter App Communication, Multi App Analysis
1. Introduction
Nowadays, mobile devices such as smartphones, are widely used for social
networking, online shopping, banking, etc. Mobile applications are increasingly
playing an essential role in our daily life, making the safety guards in mobile
operating systems an important concern for researchers and practitioners. An-
droid is the most popular mobile operating system, with 84% of the worldwide
smartphone sales to end users in first quarter of 2016 [1], and over 50 billion
app downloads so far. The large popularity of Android and its open nature
made it a primary target of hackers who are now developing malicious apps at
an industrial scale [2–9].
An Android app consists of components and uses a special interaction mech-
anism to perform Inter-Component Communication (ICC). ICC enables mod-
ular design and reuse of functionality across apps and app components. In
Android, ICC communication model is implemented as a message-passing sys-
tem, where messages are encapsulated as Intent objects. Through Intents, an
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app (or app component) can utilize functionality exposed by another app (or
app component), e.g. by passing a message to the browser to render content
or to a navigation app to display a location and provide directions to it. This
light communication model has been used by developers to design rich applica-
tion scenarios by reusing existing functionality. Unfortunately, because many
Android developers have limited expertise in security, the ICC mechanism has
brought a number of vulnerabilities [2, 3, 10–13]. Some of the ICC vulnerabili-
ties viz. Activity hijacking vulnerability (where a malicious Activity is launched
in place of the intended Activity), Intent spoofing vulnerability (where a ma-
licious app sends Intents to an exported component which originally does not
expect Intents from that app) etc.
Different research efforts have investigated weaknesses from various perspec-
tives [14–20], including detection of information leaks, analysis of the least-
privilege principle, and enhancements to Android protection mechanisms. De-
spite the significant progress, such security techniques are substantially intended
to detect and mitigate vulnerabilities in a single app [10, 21–24], but fail to
identify vulnerabilities that arise due to the interaction of multiple apps. Vul-
nerabilities due to the interaction of multiple apps, such as collusion attacks
and privilege escalation chaining, cannot be detected by techniques that ana-
lyze a single app in isolation. Thus, there is a pressing need for security analysis
techniques in such rapidly growing domains to take into account such commu-
nication vulnerabilities.
The principle of malware collusion has been recently described in a few
research papers [11, 17–19, 25–30] as the next step that malware writers may
evolve into. Collusion refers to the scenario where two or more applications
possibly (not necessary) developed by the same developer, interact with each
other to perform malicious tasks. The danger of malware collusion is that each
colluding malware only needs to request a minimal set of privileges, which may
make it appear benign under single-app analysis mechanisms [4, 17, 18, 30]. The
scenario could be think of as two utility apps one for cab booking and another is a
browser app. Now cab booking app needs to access client’s location and browser
3
app needs to connect with the internet. Lets assume that both the apps are
developed by same adversary and he intentionally puts a communication channel
between these two apps. Whenever user invokes cab booking app, along with
serving to the user it also sends location information to the browser app. Since
browser have the access to internet, it can easily send the location information
of the user to any command and control (C&C) server. Malware writers have
strong incentives to write colluding malware.
The wide usage of ICC calls in benign app pairs make accurate classification
quite challenging [4, 18, 31]. Academia and industry researchers have proposed
solutions and frameworks to analyze, and detect the collusion attacks [3, 14,
15, 17–20, 26, 30, 32, 33]. Some of these are even available as open-source
as [3, 15, 18, 33]. The solutions can be characterized using three broad types
of analysis: Static analysis, dynamic analysis and policy enforcement based
analysis.
In [18], authors propose a tool named DIALDroid, as the most recent state-
of-the-art inter-app ICC analysis tool for large scale detection of collusion and
privilege escalation. They also provide the first inter-app collusion real-apps
benchmark of 30 apps. Till now, this is the most efficient tool available in the
literature for inter-app vulnerability detection. MR-Droid [17] aims to detect
inter-app communication threats specifically intent hijacking, intent spoofing
and collusion. It proposes a MapReduce based framework to scale up compo-
sitional app analysis. DidFail [33] is another state-of-the art to detect intra-
component and inter-component information flow in a set of apps. In [26],
authors propose XMandroid, that is the first approach for detecting collusion
attacks in Android platforms. It claims to identify privilege escalation in case
of pending intents and transmission channels between dynamically built compo-
nents such as broadcast receivers. FUSE [14] is a tool that starts by single-app
static analysis accompanied with lint tool to mitigate limitations of static anal-
ysis followed by multi-app information flow analysis. IccTA [15] is a static taint
analyzer to detect privacy leaks between components in Android apps. If com-
bined with APKCombiner [3], it can also detect inter-app leakage paths.
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This survey paper aims to present a general review about inter-app com-
munication threats in particular, collusion attacks in Android framework. It
provides a better understanding of the key research challenges. We present
an abstract definition of collusion and highlight its origin. Along the way, we
cover the Android model, the communication and permission model of Android
and the main vulnerabilities that lead to a possible collusion attack. We also
cover the existing threat analysis and a detailed comparison of techniques for
intra and inter-app analysis. This review gives an insight into the strengths
and shortcomings of the known tools and provides a clear comparison for the
researchers between these tools. Finally, we present an insight into our future
research directions.
This survey paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Android model.
In Section 3, we present the Inter Process Communication (IPC) model as one
of the key features of programming model in Android. Then, in Section 4, we
present Android security risks. In Section 5, we elaborate collusion by provid-
ing a formal definition and cases where collusion attack is possible followed by
the main challenges to detect collusion attack. In Section 6, we review the in-
ter application analysis. Section 7 recalls state-of-art approaches, a thorough
comparison between them for collusion detection and lessons learned. In Sec-
tion 8, we conclude the paper and we present an insight into our future research
directions.
2. Android
Android is developed under the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), pro-
moted by the Open Handset Alliance (OHA) and maintained by Google [34].
Android is developed on top of Linux kernel due to its robust driver model,
efficient memory, process management, and networking support for the core
services. Linux Kernel is customized specifically for the embedded environment
consisting of limited resources.
Android apps are written in java; however, the native code and shared li-
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braries are developed in C/C++ to support high performance [35]. There are
two runtime environments available in Android viz. Dalvik Virtual Machine
(DVM) and Android Runtime (ART). In DVM, dex file of the Android apps
are translated to their respective native representations on demand using just-
in-time (JIT) compiler. However, in case of ART, ahead-of-time (AOT) com-
pilation is performed i.e. at the time of installation itself apps are compiled to
a ready-to-run state [36]. Therefore, ART massively improves the performance
and battery life of Android device.
Once the OS boot completes, a process known as zygote (parent of all apps)
initializes. As zygote starts, it preloads all necessary Java classes and resources,
starts System Server and opens a socket /dev/socket/zygote to listen for re-
quests for starting applications. Thus zygote process expedites the app launch-
ing process.
In the following, we present the main Android app composition followed by
Android security model viz. application signing, application permission, and
sandboxed environment.
2.1. Android App Composition
Android applications are distributed as binaries in a regular format based
on zip files with .apk as file extension. It usually contains the following files and
directories [37].
1. Manifest file: Manifest file is an XML configuration file (Android-
Manifest.xml) one per app. It is used to declare various components
of an application, their encapsulation (public or private) and the per-
missions required by the app. Android APIs offer programmatic ac-
cess to mobile device-specific features such as the GPS, vibrator, ad-
dress book, data connection, calling, SMS, camera, etc. These APIs
are usually protected by permissions. For example the Vibrator class, to
use the android.os.Vibrator.vibrate(long milliseconds) function,
which starts the phone vibrator for a number of milliseconds. The permis-
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sion android.permission.VIBRATE must be declared in the app manifest
file.
2. dex file: A Dalvik executable (classes.dex), which contains the bytecode
of the program.
3. res directory: Resources including string literals, their translations,
and references to binary resources.
4. layout directory: XML layouts describing user interface elements.
5. lib directory: The directory containing the compiled code that is spe-
cific to a software layer of a processor.
6. assets directory: The directory containing applications assets, which
can be retrieved by AssetManager.
An android app is composed of any combination of the following four compo-
nents:
• Activities: The Android libraries include a set of GUI components specif-
ically built for the interfaces of mobile devices, which have small screens
and low power consumption. One type of such component is Activities,
that represent screens which are visible to the user;
• Services: They perform background computation;
• Content Providers: They act as database-like data stores;
• Broadcast Receivers: They handle notifications sent to multiple targets.
2.2. Android Security Model
Android security depends on restricting apps by combining app signing,
sandboxing, and permissions.
2.2.1. App Signing
App signing is a prerequisite for inclusion in the official Android market
(Google Play Store). App signature is the point of trust between Google and
the third party developers to ensure app integrity and the developer reputation.
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Most developers use self-signed certificates that they can generate themselves,
which do not imply any validation of the identity of the developer. Instead, they
enable seamless updates to applications and enable data reuse among sibling
apps created by the same developer [38].
2.2.2. App Permission
App permission model regulates how applications access certain sensitive re-
sources, such as users’ personal information or sensor data (e.g., camera, GPS,
etc.). For instance, an application must have the READ CONTACTS per-
mission in order to read entries in a user’s phone [39]. System permissions
are divided into four protection levels. The two most relevant levels to this
manuscript are normal and dangerous permissions. Normal permissions require
when the app needs to access data or resources outside the app’s sandbox, but
involves very little risk to the user’s privacy or the operation of other apps. For
example, permission to set the alarm is a normal permission. Dangerous per-
missions are required when the app wants data or resources that involve user’s
private information or could potentially affect user’s stored data or the operation
of other apps. For example, the ability to read user’s contacts is a dangerous
permission [40]. Applications can also define their own permissions in order to
restrict the use of components in an application that can perform sensitive tasks.
The third level of permission is Signature permission that is used by the devel-
opers to transfer resources and data between their own applications meanwhile
safeguarding them against applications of other developers [41]. Lastly, Signa-
tureOrSystem permission which is high-level permission that includes changing
security settings, installing an application, etc. These permissions are main-
tained by OS developers and manufacturers. They are granted by System to
those applications which are either contained in the system image or signed by
the same certificate as of system image [42].
App permissions play important role in malware detection. There exist
rich literature embodies tools that attempt to identify malicious applications
through their permission requests [12, 43, 44]. Researchers have also developed
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static and dynamic analysis tools to analyze Android permission specifications
[41, 42, 45]. Permission enforcement techniques are also proposed [39].
2.2.3. Sandboxed Environment
Android apps are executed in a sandboxed environment to protect the sys-
tem, the user data, the developer apps, the device, the network, and the hosted
applications, from malware [41]. Each app process is protected with an assigned
unique id (UID) within an isolated sandbox. The sandboxing restrains other
apps or their system services from interfering the app [46]. Android protects
network access by implementing a feature Paranoid Network Security, a feature
to control Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and Internet access within the groups. If an app
has permission for a network resource (e.g., Bluetooth), the app process is as-
signed to the corresponding network access id. Thus, apart from UID, a process
may be assigned one or more group id (GIDs). An app must contain a PKI
certificate signed with the developer key. App signing procedure places an app
into an isolated sandbox assigning it an unique UID. If the certificate of an app
A matches with an already installed app B on the device, Android assigns the
same UID (i.e., sandbox) to apps A and B, permitting them to share their pri-
vate files and the manifest defined permissions. This unintended sharing can be
exploited by the malware writers as naive developers may generate two certifi-
cates. It is advisable for the developers to keep their certificates private to avoid
their misuse. The Android sandbox relies on, and augments, the Linux kernel
isolation facilities. While sandboxing is a central security feature, it comes at
the expense of interoperability. In many common situations, apps require the
ability to interact. For example, the browser app should be capable of launching
the Google Play app if the user points toward the Google Play website [47].
3. Inter-Component Communication
Inter Process Communication (IPC) is known as Inter Component Commu-
nication (ICC) in Android [48]. It is the key features of Android programming
model. It allows a component of an application to access user’s data and can
9
transfer it to another component of same or other application within the same
device, or to an external server. ICC helps to eliminate duplication of func-
tionality in different applications. Developers can leverage data and services
provided by other applications. For example, a cab booking application can ask
Google Maps for client’s or driver’s location information. This communication
between applications can reduce developer’s burden and facilitate functionality
reuse.
To support inter-component communication, there exists conventional meth-
ods called overt channels and non-conventional methods called covert channels.
Covert channels are intentionally used to hide the messages or communication.
Any app using covert channel as a medium of communication can be suspected
as malicious. Although overt channels are perfectly benign and widely used for
communication in Android apps. The main focus of this paper is to show that
how a set of apps appear perfectly benign can carry out a threat. Therefore
in this section, we will elaborate overt channels and provide glimpse of covert
channels.
3.1. Overt channel
Overt channel is an unconcealed medium provided by Android framework
for communication. In the following, we present the main channels that come
under this such as Intents, Content Providers, Shared Preferences, External
Storage, and Remote Method Calls.
3.1.1. Intents
Intents enable components of an application to invoke other components of
the same or different applications. It is also used to pass data between differ-
ent components through Bundles. It optionally contains destination component
name or action string, category and data. Intents are the preferred message
passing mechanism for asynchronous IPC in Android. The Android API defines
methods called ICC methods that can accept intents and perform actions ac-
cordingly. For example, startActivity(Intent), startService(Intent) etc.
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ICC is widely facilitated through Intents. In [15], authors highlighted that
2955 /33258 applications use ICC through intents. Intents can be sent to three
out of four components. Based on destination of ICC calls, they are categorized
into two broad categories:
Implicit Intent
Implicit intents are used when the receiver of the intent is not fixed [15].
Whenever an app wants to send the intent to all the registered components
(registration is done using an intent filter in the manifest file) within and across
the installed apps. When an app invokes API call with implicit intent then
depending on the type of component, framework serves the calls.
• If the calls are intended for activity, then users are asked for the choice.
• If the calls are intended for service, then the framework will randomly
choose one of the registered services.
• If the calls are intended for broadcast receivers, then the framework de-
livers to all the receivers.
In the following, we present a sample code of implicit intent where
"com.example.msgSendFirst" is the action string:
/**
* Implicit Intent
*/
Intent intent = new Intent("com.exampke.msgSendFirst");
startActivity(intent);
Explicit Intent
Explicit intents are used when receiver of the intent is fixed. When an
app invokes API call with explicit intent, the framework will deliver the intent
to the component that is mentioned in the intent. A Sample code of explicit
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intent where "this, LoginActivity.class" is the address of the destination
component:
/**
* Explicit Intent
*/
Intent intent = new Intent(this,LoginActivity.class);
startActivity(intent);
3.1.2. Content Provider
Content Providers are used to transfer structured data across components of
same or different apps. It stores information in tables like relational databases.
To access or modify data in Content Provider, apps need ContentResolver
objects. An app can also attach read and write permissions to the content
provider it owns.
public class SchoolProvider extends ContentProvider {
/**
* Declaration
*/
static final String PROVIDER_NAME = "com.example.provider.School";
static final String URL = "content://" + PROVIDER_NAME + "/students";
static final Uri CONTENT_URI = Uri.parse(URL);
...........
...........
/**
* Database specific constant declarations
*/
private SQLiteDatabase db;
static final String DATABASE_NAME = "School";
static final String STUDENTS_TABLE_NAME = "students";
.............
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..............
/**
* Helper class that actually creates and manages
* the provider’s underlying data repository.
*/
private static class DatabaseHelper extends SQLiteOpenHelper {
DatabaseHelper(Context context){
super(context, DATABASE_NAME, null, DATABASE_VERSION);
}
@Override
public void onCreate(SQLiteDatabase db)
{
db.execSQL(CREATE_DB_TABLE);
}
public boolean onCreate() {
/**
* Create a write able database which will trigger its
* creation if it doesn’t already exist.
*/
}
public Uri insert(Uri uri, ContentValues values) {
/**
* Add a new student record
*/
}
public Cursor query(Uri uri, String[] projection, String
selection,String[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder) {
/**
* Code for querying the database
*/
}
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public int delete(Uri uri, String selection, String[]
selectionArgs) {
/**
* Code for deleting records from the database
*/
public int update(Uri uri, ContentValues values, String selection,
String[] selectionArgs) {
/**
* Code for updating records from the database
*/
}
3.1.3. Shared Preference
Shared Preference is an operating system feature that allows apps to store
key-value pairs of data. Its purpose is to be used to store preferences informa-
tion. Apps can use key-value pairs to exchange information if proper permissions
are defined when accessing and storing data.
/**
* Declaration
*/
SharedPreferences sharedPref = getActivity().
getPreferences(Context.MODE_PRIVATE);
/**
* Write to Shared Preferences
*/
SharedPreferences.Editor editor = sharedPref.edit();
editor.putInt(getString(R.string.
saved_high_score), newHighScore);
editor.commit();
/**
* Read from Shared Preferences
*/
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int defaultValue = getResources().getInteger
(R.string.saved_high_score_default);
long highScore = sharedPref.getInt
(getString(R.string.saved_high_score),
defaultValue);
3.1.4. External Storage
External Storage is the storage space external to an app. It includes USB
connection, SD card and even non-removable storage. Apps accessing the ex-
ternal storage need to declare the READ EXTERNAL STORAGE permission. Apps
declaring the WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE can write and read from external stor-
age.
/**
* Write to SD card
*/
File myFile = new File("/sdcard/mysdfile.txt");
myFile.createNewFile();
FileOutputStream fOut = new FileOutputStream(myFile);
OutputStreamWriter myOutWriter = new OutputStreamWriter(fOut);
myOutWriter.append(txtData.getText());
myOutWriter.close();
fOut.close();
/**
* Read from SD Card
*/
File myFile = new File("/sdcard/mysdfile.txt");
FileInputStream fIn = new FileInputStream(myFile);
BufferedReader myReader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(fIn));
myReader.close();
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3.1.5. Remote Method Calls
Remote methods enable to make method calls that look local but are exe-
cuted in another process. It is same as remote procedural calls (RPC) in other
systems. In Android, due to sandboxing, one process cannot access the memory
of another process. In order to communicate, they need to pack their objects
into the primitives that operating system can understand and unpack them
again at receiver’s end. This is facilitated by Binder, Messenger and AIDL.
• Binder : Binder supports remote method calls within same application
without the support of multi-threading. Binders are the entity which
allows activities and services to obtain a reference to another service. It
allows not simply send messages to services but directly invoke methods on
them. Binder class provides direct access to public methods in the service
but can be used only when the service is used by the local application and
in the same process. For example, it would work if a music application
that needs to bind an activity to its own service that’s playing music in
the background.
• Messenger : Messenger supports remote method calls across the applica-
tions without the support of multi-threading. It represents a reference to
a Handler that can be sent to a remote process via an Intent. Messenger
provides an interface to the service to communicate with remote processes.
This allows inter-process communication without the use of AIDL. This
can be used in the case where remote IPC is required but multi-threading
support by the service is not required.
• AIDL: AIDL supports remote method calls across the applications with
the support of multi-threading. Android provides an API to handle mar-
shalling and unmarshalling of objects called Android’s Interface Definition
Language (AIDL). AIDL is necessary only if remote access of the service is
required for IPC and want to handle multithreading in that service. AIDL
is complex to implement as this interface sends simultaneous requests to
the service, which must then handle multi-threading.
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3.2. Covert channel
Covert channel is a secret medium which exploits shared resources and use
them for communication [26]. Timing channels and storage channels come under
the covert channel.
3.2.1. Timing channels
In timing channel, the information between applications is synchronously
transmitted using shared resource having no storage capability. Battery use,
Phone call frequency are examples of timing channels.
3.2.2. Storage channels
In storage channel, the information between applications is asynchronously
transmitted using shared resource with storage. Phone call logs, Content
providers are examples of storage channels.
4. Android Security Risks and Consequences
Android ensures security through its sandbox model, application signing and
the permission model for managing IPC effectively and efficiently. In spite of
these measures, Android is vulnerable to many security risks. According to the
recent OWASP mobile security report [49], out of 91 reported security risks, 85
are recorded to be present in Android. This makes Android security a serious
concern. These risks are outcome of either maliciously exploiting the legitimate
procedures provided by android such as ICC, or taking advantage of unchecked
processes occurring in the system. In the following, we focus on Intent based
attacks and their consequences.
4.1. Intent based attacks
We focus our attention on the security challenges of Android communication
from the perspectives of Intent sending and receiving. In section 4.1.1, we focus
on the Intent receiving, and consider vulnerabilities related to receiving Intents
coming from other applications. In Section 4.1.2, we consider how sending
Intents to the wrong application can leak user information.
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4.1.1. Intent Spoofing
Intent spoofing refers to a typical scenario where a vulnerable app has a com-
ponent that expects Intent from Android framework or itself. If the component
is exposed, then other malicious apps can send forged Intents, and then spoof
this app in order to trigger misbehaved actions. In the following, we classify the
Intent spoofing to three subclasses [10]: malicious broadcast injection, malicious
activity launch, and malicious service launch.
Malicious Broadcast Injection. Broadcast receivers are vulnerable to malicious
broadcast injection when they receive Intents with system actions [10]. An ex-
ample scenario of this attack is that some Intents contain action strings that
only the operating system may add to broadcast Intents. If a malicious ap-
plication sends an Intent explicitly addressed to the target Receiver, without
containing the system action string. The Receiver will be tricked into perform-
ing functionality that only the system should be able to trigger if it does not
check the Intent’s action.
Malicious Activity Launch. A malicious activity launch is executed by other ap-
plications with explicit or implicit Intents. The impact of this attack is that the
malicious Activity’s UI will load instead of the targeted one. In [10], the authors
classify three types of possible attacks when launching malicious activity:
• Modification of data in the background caused due to non verification of
the origin of the Intent or leading to a change in the application state;
• A user can be misleaded between malicious and victim applications. She
might make changes to the victim application while believing she is inter-
acting with the malicious one.
• A victim application could leak some sensitive information returning a
result to its caller upon completion.
Malicious Service Launch. In the same way as an Activity, a Service, if not
protected with permissions, any application can bind it. This vulnerability
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could lead even to leak information or perform unauthorized tasks, depending
on the type of Service [10].
4.1.2. Intent Hijacking
The Intent hijacking threat is illustrated when an Intent could not reach
the intended recipient via an implicit ICC, and then it may be hijacked by an
unauthorized app [10]. We classify this threat based on the type of the send-
ing component: broadcast receivers hijacking, activity hijacking, and service
hijacking.
Broadcast Receivers Hijacking. Broadcast Receivers can be vulnerable to active
denial of service attacks or eavesdropping. An eavesdropper can read the con-
tents of a broadcast Intent without interrupting the broadcast. This is a risk
whenever an application sends a public broadcast. A malicious Broadcast Re-
ceiver could eavesdrop on all public broadcasts from all applications by creating
an Intent filter that lists all possible actions, data, and categories [10].
Activity Hijacking. In an Activity hijacking attack, a malicious Activity is
launched instead of the intended Activity [6]. This attack works as follows: The
malicious Activity registers to receive another applications implicit Intents, and
it is then started instead of the expected Activity. The impact of this attack is
dreadful since the malicious activity could read the data in the Intent and then
immediately relay it to a legitimate activity [50] into the victim application.
Service Hijacking. The service hijacking attack occurs when a malicious service
intercepts an Intent designed for a legitimate service [51]. The impact of this
attack is that the initiating application establishes a connection with a malicious
service instead of the legitimate one. The malicious service can steal data and
lie about completing requested actions [52].
4.2. Android Risk Consequences
In the following, we focus on two major consequences of the Android security
risks: privilege escalation, and privacy leaks.
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Figure 1: Privileged Escalation attack scenario
4.2.1. Privilege Escalation
Android security framework enforces permission protected model that allows
the user to regulate the access of data by an application. It has been shown
that applications can bypass this security model by exploiting transitive per-
mission usage known as privilege escalation [53], [28], [26], [54]. This refers to
the scenario where two or more applications with a limited set of permissions
communicate with each other to gain indirect privilege escalation and can per-
form unauthorized actions.
Figure 1 shows an example of privilege escalation attack. In this example, an
android device contain 2 apps - Contacts manager and News. Contact man-
ager includes permissions READ CONTACTS and WRITE CONTACTS. On the other
hand, News app includes permission INTERNET. Contact manager cannot access
internet and news app cannot access contacts stored on the device. However,
they can communicate via Intents. Contact manager sends an Intent carrying
contact information as a payload to news app. As news app can access internet,
it can transmit it to outside world. Hence, news app can access contacts, even
if it does not contain permission to do so. Hence its privileges got escalated.
4.2.2. Privacy Leaks
Privacy leak occurs if there is a secret (without user consent) path from
sensitive data as source to statements sending this data outside the application
or device, called sink. This path may be within a single component or across
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multiple components. Thus, analyzing components separately is not enough
to detect leaks. It is necessary to perform an inter-component analysis of
applications. Android app analysts could leverage such tools to identify
malicious apps that leak private data. For the tool to be useful, it has to be
highly precise and minimize the false positive rate when reporting applications
leaking private data. For example, IccTA, an inter-component communication
Taint Analysis tool [15]. It is for a sound and precise detection of ICC links
and leaks.
Recent works have demonstrated that Android apps exhibit different privacy
leaks, that are mainly build around the collusion attack [55–58]. The main
vulnerability comes from the fact that these leaks are exacerbated by several
applications that can interact to leak data using the inter-app communication
mechanism [2]. The aforementioned security risk could lead to the collusion
attack resulting in privacy abuse. Through the inter-app ICCs, two or more
apps can collude to perform malicious actions. We give more details about the
collusion attacks in Section 5.
5. Collusion
The Android security model is designed to protect data, applications and
devices from security threats. It is guarding apps by combining app signing,
sandboxing, and permissions. Unfortunately, these restrictions can be bypassed
by colluding apps. The combined permission of these apps allow them to carry
out attack, that could not be possible by a single app. Let us consider the
following example where a collusion consists of one app permitted to access
some personal data, and this app passes the data to a second app that is allowed
to transmit the data. Moreover, the Android OS does not check if an app
that is accessing a permission-protected resource through another app has itself
requested that permission. We believe that collusion is worth investigation
since it could be exploited by criminals, and become a serious threat in the near
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future.
In this section, we start with a brief history of the origin of collusion. Then
we define collusion along with its categories on the grounds of application prop-
erties. We also highlight some challenges faced in detecting collusion. For the
sake of clarity, we define some terminologies such as Sensitive Resource Access:
When an Android app access the system resource that is protected with some
dangerous permission then that access to the resource is called Sensitive Re-
source Access. Sensitive Information: Any piece of data that generates from
sensitive resource access becomes Sensitive Information. Leakage: It happens
when the sensitive information moves out of device boundaries without user
consent.
5.1. History
The problem of colluding apps can be traced back to confused deputy attack.
This attack was first reported in 1988 by Norm Hardy [59]. This attack can
happen when an application provides a public interface and access some sensitive
resources. Other applications could use that interface to access the sensitive
resources. The application providing access to the sensitive resource is called a
confused deputy.
In 2011, the work in [43] mapped confused deputy attack with permission
re-delegation attack. In particular, a careless developer may expose permission-
protected resources through exported component. Other applications can access
those resources through ICC to that component.
In 2011, the first documented example of intentional permission re-delegation
was presented by [11]. They developed Soundcomber, a Trojan with few and
innocuous permissions, that can extract a small amount of targeted private in-
formation from the audio sensor of the phone and conveys information remotely
without direct network access. This is the example of intentional permission
re-delegation and illustrated in Figure 2.
The Soundcomber example shows the difference between app collusion and
confused deputy attacks. In app collusion the exposure of the sensitive resource
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Figure 2: Soundcomber working architecture
is intentional [53].
5.2. Definition
Assume, A be a set of all Android apps and P be a set of all possible
dangerous permissions in Android.
Let, a and b are two apps with permission set pa and pb respectively such that:
a, b ∈ A and pa, pb ⊂ P ,
Suppose, a performs sensitive resource access that requires permission α to
generate sensitive information ι such that,
α ∈ (pa − pb),
If f(ι) (perform any operation(s) on ι) flows to b through any number of apps,
and b performs sensitive resource access that requires permission β to leak f(ι)
such that,
β ∈ pb,
Then we say that a and b are colluding apps.
5.3. Scenarios
For the sake of completeness, we illustrate the collusion definition by three
different scenarios based on app properties: 1) Among colluding apps, all are
signed by the same signature; 2) Among colluding apps, all are signed with
different signatures; 3) dynamic colluding apps.
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5.3.1. Among colluding apps, all are signed by same signature
Android requires that all apps have to be signed with developer’s certificate
before they can be installed. Android uses this certificate to identify the
developer of an app [38]. There are some signing considerations as:
• App Modularity: Android allows apps signed by the same certificate to
run in the same address space, if applications choose this, the system
treats them as a single application.
• Code/Data Sharing: Android provides signature-based permissions en-
forcement, so that an app can expose functionality to another app that is
signed with a specified certificate.
In this scenario, apps request a minimal permission set at the time of in-
stallation; and they can expand it later with the permissions of other apps with
same signature. The shared permission set exposes sensitive information leakage
path and thus emanate collusion.
5.3.2. Among colluding apps, all are signed with different signatures
Android applications signed by different signatures always run in different
user address space. Such apps are not allowed to access each others data but
can communicate with each other. Through this communication they can pass
data. The general mode of such communication are Intents. Application do not
need any specific permission to send Intent. In this scenario, collusion emanate
if there exist some mode of communication between apps and they are sharing
some sensitive information through it that is creating leakage path.
5.3.3. Dynamic colluding apps
This is a new type of threat called threat of split-personality behavior [60]
where the attackers divide malware samples into a benign and malicious part,
such that the malicious part is hidden from analysis by packing, encrypting
or outsourcing of the code. In such cases the app appears as benign during
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analysis phase but while running on real device it become malicious. Similar
case exists in case of app collusion, depending on the availability of an analysis
system, malware can either behave benignly or load malicious code at runtime.
In this scenario, static part of the app collude with dynamic part of the code
to leak information. The dynamic part may be another app that get down-
loaded and installed using social engineering attack or it can be some dynamic
code loading. The proof of concept of this type of collusion is demonstrated
in [61]. They modified the well known open source malware named AndroRat
(Android Remote Administration Tool). This app connects to server and allow
remote control of the device. The authors divide the app into two and devel-
oped AndroRAT-Split. They put the main service class into one app and added
the activity class into another app to create collusion attack. Detection rate
of original sample on VirusTotal is 15/56 i.e. 15 out of 56 antivirus engines
says that the app is malicious; whereas when AndroRAT-Split is analyzed on
Virus-Total, the detection rate is 0/56 i.e. it is considered as benign app.
5.4. Challenges in Collusion Detection
The detection of Android ICC based collusion faces many challenges. In the
following, we summarize the major ones:
• How to characterize the context associated with communication channels
with fine granularity?
• How to provide scalable solutions with minimum complexity to vet a large
number of apps for possible collusion?
• How to define security policies for classification that reduce the number
of false alerts?
• It’s pretty hard to have a policy that is at the same time consistent and
still provides realistic results without over-tainting.
The solutions to detect collusion in apps must be capable of doing analysis of
multiple apps simultaneously aka inter-app analysis.
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6. Inter-Application Analysis
This section discusses the main defense techniques for inter-app analysis:
static, dynamic and policy based.
6.1. Static Inter-App Analysis
Static inter-app analysis consists of examining and auditing the code without
executing it [62]. Android apps are analyzed without really running them by
inspecting the source code. Static analysis techniques act as a potential weapon
for conducting the behavioral analysis of an application i.e. detecting whether
an application is benign or malicious. It extensively explores data flows in
a program and subsequently detect paths through which information can be
leaked. It can be used to detect problems such as cross site scripting (XSS) [63],
SQL injection [64], buffer overflows [65], access control problems and many more.
Resources and techniques of static inter-app analysis are detailed below.
6.1.1. Resources
The resources of Android apps from which information can be extracted in
static analysis includes manifest file, dalvik byte code, libraries, etc [66].
The information obtained from manifest file includes the name of the package,
list of components, list of permissions, version, etc. It also reveals information
about intents and intent-filters used for communication. Level of API and li-
braries required by an application for execution is also mentioned in the file [67].
Android apps are written in java and compiled to byte code. This byte code
is further translated to dalvik byte code and stored in classes.dex (dalvik exe-
cutable) file. This file reveals information about the structure of an application
and methods used by it. It is analyzed to detect potentially malicious actions
such as sending SMS to premium numbers, use of reflection or encryption, ac-
cess of sensitive resources, etc. [68].
Java libraries can be statically analyzed in order to obtain data flow summaries
of an application. It can be useful to determine malicious flow in an application.
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6.1.2. Techniques
The technique employed to perform static analysis depends on the depth
and purpose of analysis. Various static analysis techniques used by researchers
include taint analysis [69], dataflow analysis [70], entry point analysis [71] etc.
Some of the most prevalently used techniques are explained below.
Taint analysis is also known as user-input dependency checking [69]. The
concept behind taint analysis is that any variable altered by the user becomes
tainted and is considered vulnerable. The taint may flow from variable to
variable during a course of operations and if the tainted variable is utilized
to perform some harmful operation, it becomes a breach in security. Taint
analysis detects the set of instructions that are affected by user inputs. It helps
in identifying sensitive information leakage.
Data flow analysis determines the information flow between various compo-
nents. It is the essential analysis need to detect leakage of sensitive data. For
instance, for a variable, it can detect all the possible sources of a variable’s value
i.e. where do values assigned to a variable come from, all the possible values
a variable can possess, all the sinks where its value passes further, etc [72].
Data-flow analysis can be of various types depending on the context of analysis
[66].
• Context sensitive data flow analysis [73] is an inter-procedural analysis
technique. It examines target of a function call by focusing on calling
context.
• Path sensitive data flow analysis [74] takes into account the branching
statements. It analyzes the information obtained by the state obtained at
conditional instructions.
• Flow sensitive data flow analysis [75] considers the order of instructions
in a program.
• Inter-procedural data flow analysis [76] takes into account the flow of
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information between procedures. It is achieved by constructing call graphs
• Intra-procedural data flow analysis [77] involves the flow of information
within a procedure.
Entry point analysis [71] helps in determining where a program starts its
execution. It is very difficult to identify starting point due to the use of callbacks
and multiple entry points.
Accessibility analysis [78] contributes in evaluating the likelihood of following
a path betwe [62]en two components. It helps in building reachability graphs
showing the path followed through methods for execution of an application.
Side-Effect analysis is performed to compute which variables of a method are
affected by its execution [66].
6.2. Dynamic Inter-App Analysis
Dynamic inter-app analysis refers to the analysis of a program by executing
it [62]. Android apps are examined and reviewed by actually executing them on
real devices and emulators. Since static analysis does not portray the complete
picture of an application, for example network data stored in the memory heap
during run time is not available before executing app, obfuscated strings are hard
to recognize from decompiled codes etc, therefore dynamic analysis is important
to identify malicious applications, information leakage, sensitive data flows and
vulnerabilities present in applications [79].
6.2.1. Resources
The resources of Android apps from which information is extracted in dy-
namic analysis includes application framework, information about native code
libraries, kernel parameters, cpu parameters, memory parameters, information
about dynamically loaded libraries, etc. [80].
Application framework is a software library which imparts basic structure for
developing applications. It provides information about components and pro-
cesses currently running and invoked API calls. It keeps record of which disk
28
location belong to which file, keystrokes done and all the network inputs and
outputs of function call.
Native library is a library that includes native code. Native code refers to a
code written in C or C++ and compiled to machine code. Since native libraries
are linked at run time, dynamic analysis is the suitable approach to identify the
data flows in an application [14].
Kernel is the core of Android operating system. It is responsible for the manage-
ment of hardware interactions. It provides information about the interactions
with system protected resources which are not directly accessible [81].
Other parameters of cpu, memory etc. can be captured dynamically when the
program is running.
6.2.2. Techniques
Various dynamic analysis techniques used by researchers that include System
hooking [82], Taint analysis [2], Instrumentation [83], System call tracing [84],
Debugging [85], Code emulation [86] etc.
System hooking involves altering or amplifying the functionalities of applica-
tions or components of application, by anticipating function calls, events and
transmitted messages between the components [87]. It assists in conducting dy-
namic analysis by intercepting and modifying API calls made by the target app.
It is used to capture data flows, construct event ordering, record the parameters
of passed messages and store values of run-time variables [81].
Dynamic taint analysis [88] starts by tainting the data that is initiated from un-
trusted sources, specifically user supplied inputs. Later, these tainted variables
are stored and whenever any of these variables are used for carrying sensitive
data they are tracked down to detect sensitive paths [86].
The term instrumentation pertains to the capability of monitoring or evaluating
the performance of product and interpreting errors [89]. Android apps are in-
strumented to monitor actions of specific components such as logging number of
times a particular service is called, etc. It is achieved by injecting smali codes.
Smali is an intermediate representation of dalvik byte code which is inserted to
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keep log of actions of specific components.
In order to perform system call tracing, a system call tracer is embedded into
the system that logs the invoked interrupts or APIs as the program runs on the
system [90].
In code emulation, the malicious code is executed on virtual machines with repli-
cated CPU and memory management system, rather than real processor [90].
6.3. Policy Enforcement Based Analysis
Policy (a.k.a rule) enforcement based techniques make use of certain set of
policies(rules) that are considered as normal or benign. These policies can be
represented either in the form of regular expressions or any new policy language.
The access of apps to any policy protected resource is verified against the pre-
defined policy-set [91]. Verification can be done statically on the intermediate
program code and can also be enforced at install-time or run-time. If the re-
source access adhered to the policy-set, it is considered benign. Any violation is
referred as malicious behaviour [92]. The challenge posed by this defence mech-
anism lies in identifying, defining and maintaining the policy-set. It should not
be very strict that may generate false-positives but at the same time it should
not be too liberal to generate more false-negatives [9].
6.3.1. Resources
The resources of Android apps from which information can be extracted in
policy based analysis techniques depend on the nature of the policy-set and
where they are applied [93]. For eg., if the policy set considers permissions and
their corresponding API call then, manifest, dex files and libraries are suffice to
extract relevant information. However, when policies are enforced at install-time
or run-time, hooking or instrumentation need to be done. In later case, relevant
information can be extracted from system parameter like registers, CPU etc.
6.3.2. Techniques
In order to protect users’ private/sensitive data in Android, various solutions
have been proposed based on controlling the access of sensitive resources. The
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access control can be apply at various system abstraction layers viz. kernel-
layer, middle-ware layer and application layer [94]. The access controls are
of various type viz. Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access
Control (DAC), Role Based Access Control (RBAC), Context Based Access
Control (CBAC) and Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) [95, 96].
In MAC, whenever app wants to access policy protected resource, Android
kernel will verify the access against predefined rule-set. The access is allowed
only if it is authorized. These rule-set is not modified by app or user. In
DAC, user can define an access control list (ACL) on specific resources. These
resources can be accessed when the owner provides permission. RBAC is based
on the roles of an individual user. The user is assigning to different positions,
with permissions to use the resources. The user can access sensitive data based
on their assigned role. Till Android 5.1.1, once privileges are granted to the
applications, they cannot be revoked. However, in many cases whether the
application get a privilege or not depends on the user context and therefore CBAC
comes into existence in Android. It has the capability to give privileges with
dynamically granted or revoked to applications. In ABAC, granting privileges to
the users is based on attributes which combine with the policies. Authorization
relies on a set of operations that is determined by evaluating the attributes
associated with the subjects, objects, and requested services.
7. State of the art approaches
In the following section, we present different experimental approaches for
the detection of intra and inter-application communication vulnerabilities.
7.1. Static Analysis
This section briefly explains about the approaches conducting static analysis.
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7.1.1. MR-Droid: A Scalable and Prioritized Analysis of Inter-App Communi-
cation Risks [17]
Objective: The paper aims to detect inter-app communication threats
specifically intent hijacking, intent spoofing and collusion. Authors proposed a
MapReduce based framework to scale up compositional app analysis. They also
prioritized the identified ICC risks, based on the communication context of apps.
Methodology: The MapReduce based approach is divided into two broad
steps. In the first step, MR-Droid identifies ICC nodes (both sources and sinks),
ICC edges (intent based ICC communication channels) and group inter-app
ICCs that belong to an app pair using MapReduce. In the second step, risk
assessment module of MR-Droid assigns risk levels to the app pairs based on
the semantics and contextual information of the identified ICC channels. The
risk assessment module detects the presence of risk and assigns ranking to the
detected risk. Prioritizing risks helps to reduce false alarms. To validate the
approach, authors manually analyzed around 200 apps.
Dataset Used: The dataset consists of 11, 996 apps from 24 popular
app categories belonging to Google Play Store and 8 apps from DroidBench
3.0 [97] inter-app communication category.
Limitations: The paper suffers from the following limitations:
• The proposed approach can handle intent based ICC communications only.
Therefore, security risks posed by other inter-app channels like content
providers, shared preferences etc. cannot be detected.
• Currently, the approach can detect privacy leakage across two apps. How-
ever, leakage involving more than two apps are missed.
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7.1.2. Detecting Inter-App Information Leakage Paths [32]
Objective: The paper presented a model-checking based approach for
inter-app collusion detection. The authors presented compositional app analysis
to identify set of conspiring apps involved in the collusion. They developed 8
colluding apps and contributed to DroidBench 3.0 [97].
Methodology: The proposed approach is divided into four broad steps.
In the first step, it leverages DARE [98] and IC3 [99] to extract information
related to ICC sources, sinks and, intent based communication channels. In
the second step, data-flow analysis has been carried out to map sensitive
information provided by sensitive API call to the outgoing intent followed
by storing all the extracted information in the database. In the third step,
PROMELA model is generated for each app. In the fourth step, model
checking is done using the generated models and collusion detection property
([](STATUS==SAFE)) mentioned in the linear temporal logic (LTL) form. If the
compositional model of apps do not satisfy the property, then that set of apps
are declared as colluding apps set.
Dataset Used: The dataset consists of self-developed 8 apps and con-
tributed to DroidBench 3.0 [97] under inter-app communication category.
Limitations: The paper suffers from the following limitations:
• The proposed approach can handle intent based ICC communications only.
Therefore, security risks posed by other inter-app channels like content
providers, shared preferences etc. cannot be detected.
• Not addresses the issue of scalability.
7.1.3. Towards Automated Android App Collusion Detection [100]
Objective: The paper mentioned that collusion can cause information
theft, money theft or service misuse. They defined collusion between apps
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as some set of actions executed by the apps that can lead to a threat.
They proposed two approaches to identify candidates for collusion. One is
rule based approach developed in Prolog and other is statistical based approach.
Methodology: In rule based approach, some features are used to identify
colluding apps. These features include permissions, communication channels,
and set of some actions viz. accessing sensitive information, sending information
etc. The statistical approach consists defining probabilistic model, training of
the model that means estimating the model parameter on the training set and
validating the model on test dataset. Additionally the paper also presented
that model-checking is the feasible approach to detect collusion in Android apps.
Dataset Used: The dataset consists of ∼ 9000 malicious and ∼ 9000
benign apps developed by Intel Security.
Limitations: The paper suffers from the following limitations:
• The rule based approach can be easily evaded using some evasion tech-
niques like reflection, obfuscation etc.
• The statistical approach performance could be due to a bias of validation
dataset towards the methodology.
• Not addresses the issue of scalability.
7.1.4. User-Intention Based Program Analysis for Android Security [101]
Objective: The paper proposed a data structure called ICC Map
that statically captures cross-app information flow and based on self-made
security policies classify communication among apps as collusion or no collusion.
Methodology: ICC Map is a hash map data structure. It stores ICC
entry and exit points that can be extracted by scanning bytecode of source and
target apps respectively. It is used to statically characterize the inter-app ICC
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channels among the Android apps. The detailed description of ICC Map is as
follows:
• ICC exit points refer to all Intent based ICC APIs like
startActivity(Intent i), startService(Intent i) etc., user
triggers like onClick() and APIs that retrieve private data such as
getAccounts(), getPassword() etc.
• After extracting exit points, data dependence graph (DDG) of intra- and
inter-procedural dependencies has been constructed.
• Then, from each ICC exit point, backward depth-first traversal on DDG
is done to check if it involves private data or user trigger and store this
information in SourceAppICCExitHashMap.
• Then construct the data dependence graph (DDG) for the target app and
perform forward depth-first traversal on its DDG from each ICC entry
point to find any critical operations and store this information in Targe-
tAppICCEntryHashMap.
In SourceAppICCExitHashMap, each entry consists of source component name
as key, and a list of ICC exit, sensitive data and user trigger as value. For exam-
ple, (compX,{startService(Intent i), getDeviceID(), onClick()}) rep-
resents one entry in the SourceAppICCExitHashMap, where compX is the com-
ponent name that initiates the inter-app ICC call startService(Intent i) with
sensitive data device ID included as part of the Intent of this call and onClick()
as the user event to trigger this call.
Similarly, in TargetAppEntryHashMap, each entry consists of target com-
ponent name as key, and a list of ICC entry, component protection
and critical operation as value. For example, (compY, {onStart(), No,
java.io.FileOutputStream.write(...)}) represents one entry in the Tar-
getAppICCEntryHashMap, where compY is the component name that receives
the inter-app ICC call, and onStart() is the entry point of compY which is not
protected (No) and has critical operation java.io.FileOutputStream.write(...).
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Given the above two hash maps, they connect inter-app ICC calls as follows:
• First search for the source component name in SourceAppICCEx-
itHashMap. The search results return its value(ICCExitName, Sensitive-
Data, UserTrigger).
• Then, search the same with the target component in TargetAppICCEn-
tryHashMap to get its value(ICCEntryName, CompProtection, Critical-
Operations).
• After that, connect the ICC exit point in the source component with its
corresponding ICC entry point in the target component.
These operations provide the complete path of the ICC calls from the source to
the destination across multiple apps. Authors call these paths as ICC links and
entire data structure as ICC Map. ICC Map cannot be used for apps collusion
detection but it helps to identify pair or group of communicating apps.
After this they define four rules/policies that are as follows:
Suppose component C1 in app P1 calls component C2 in app P2 , i.e., C1→ C2
• If the ICC exit point in C1 does not have a valid user trigger and the
target component C2 is not protected by permission checking and has
critical operation, then this ICC channel is classified as a high risk inter-
app ICC channel.
• If the ICC exit point in C1 has a valid user trigger and the target compo-
nent C2 is not protected by permission checking and has critical operation,
then this ICC channel is classified as a medium risk inter-app ICC channel.
• If the ICC exit point in C1 does not have a valid user trigger and the
target component C2 is protected by permission checking and has critical
operation, then this ICC channel is classified as a medium risk inter-app
ICC channel.
• If the ICC exit point in C1 has a valid user trigger and the target com-
ponent C2 is protected by permission checking and has critical operation,
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then this ICC channel is classified as a low (or no) risk inter-app ICC
channel.
Authors have also extended these rules to more fine-grained 16 rules that
include inter-app ICC call. The detail description of these 16 rules are available
in [102].
Thus, based on ICC Map and a set of security policies they can differentiate
between benign communicating apps and colluding ones. In their experiments,
the proposed method can correctly detect 97.9% of the 1,433 malware samples.
The false negative rate is 2.1%, i.e., 31 malware apps are misclassified as benign.
Dataset Used: 1,433 malware apps collected from [103] and Virus
Share. 2,684 apps from Google Play market.
Limitations: ICC Map approach suffers from following limitations:
• ICC Map cannot detect collusion through indirect communication channel
such as shared files.
• ICC Map cannot capture the scenario that involves complex string opera-
tion like both apps read/write to files, however, the filenames are dynam-
ically generated using string operations. Collusion occurs through such
scenario is missed by the proposed approach.
• The approach statically identifies the predicted risk level associated with
the inter-app ICC calls, but it does not confirm the existence of the col-
lusion.
• The proposed approach has difficulty in performing the analysis on pro-
grams that employ obfuscation techniques, dynamic code loading, or use
of reflection.
7.1.5. IccTA [15]
Objective: IccTA is a static taint analyzer to detect privacy leaks between
components in Android apps. It claims to improve its precision of analysis by
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propagating context-aware information.
Methodology: IccTA tool takes APK file (dalvik bytecode) as input
and convert it into Jimple (soot’s intermediate representation [104]). After
that, it extracts ICC links and related information like ICC call parame-
ters, Intent filter etc. using Epicc [105] and also parses URIs (eg. scheme,
host) to support Content Provider related ICC methods (eg. query) using
IC3 [99]. To extract ICC links, IccTA have to identify source and target
components. Source components are the components that initiate ICC method
and target components are resolved by analyzing the values of Intent filter
from AndroidManifest file of the app. It also needs to analyze bytecode
because Broadcast Receivers may be declared at runtime. Then it stores all
the extracted information into a database. Based on the extracted ICC links,
IccTA modifies Jimple representation to directly connect the components to
enable data-flow analysis between them.
IccTA handles three types of methods, ICC methods are replaced by an
instantiation of the target component with the appropriate Intent. For callback
methods, the tool takes care of both UI triggered event as well as callbacks
triggered by Java or the Android system. To handle lifecycle methods, the
tool generates a dummyMain method for each component in which it models,
the entire lifecycle model of the component. IccTA leverages FlowDroid [73]
to build a complete control flow graph of the Android app under analysis.
This graph allows to analyze the context (eg. the value of Intent) between
two components. In the end, IccTA also stores the reported tainted path
(leaks) into the database which can be reused in later analysis. IccTA achieved
96.6% precision while analyzing privacy leaks from the samples of DroidBench
and ICC-Bench. IccTA can perform inter-app analysis when used with AP-
KCombiner [3] which is a static tool that scales down inter-app communication
analysis to intra-app communication analysis. APKCombiner disassembled
every app to obtain manifest and smali files using android apktool [106], a
reverse engineering tool. After that all files corresponding to different apps are
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combined together into a single directory and conflicts are resolved.
Dataset Used: 22 apps from DroidBench, 15000 apps from Google
Play Store, 1260 apps from Genome Malware, 16 apps from ICC-Bench.
Limitations: IccTA suffers from the following limitations:
• IccTA resolves reflective calls only if their argument are string constants,
which is not always the case.
• It cannot detect leak through multi-threading. It assumes the execution
of threads in arbitrary but sequential order.
• It can miss leaks through native calls that their rules model incorrectly.
• It cannot handle rarely used ICC methods like startActivities and
sendOrderedBroadcastAsUser.
• It cannot resolve complicated string operations which are generated using
StringBuilder.
• The string analysis done by IccTA is within a single methods which may
cause false alarms.
• IccTA cannot analyze apps of big size as it requires too much memory
consumptions and system often gets hang.
7.1.6. Automatic Detection of Inter-Application Permission Leaks in Android
Applications: PermissionFlow [13]
Objective: PermissionFlow is a single-app static analysis approach
that handles attacks related to obtaining unauthorized access to permission-
protected information. It focuses on three types of attacks viz. permission
collusion, confused deputy and Intent spoofing. PermissionFlow uses taint
analysis to capture the flow of permissions.
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Methodology: PermissionFlow consists of three major modules, i.e.
Permission Mapper, Rule Generator and Decision Maker. The approach
consists of identifying APIs whose execution leads to permission-checking. This
is done through permission mapper. Then another module, rule generator will
define rules for tainting. It considers the APIs selected by permission mapper,
to be the sources of taint and define rules to capture their corresponding sinks.
Then based on the information extracted from APK file of an app through
apktool and dex2jar, PermissionFlow leverages another open-source tool named
Andromeda to identify flows and components. Decision maker will allow or
disallow the flow based on permissions.
Dataset Used: PermissionFlow tests 313 popular Android Market ap-
plications, and then identifies that 56% of them use inter-component
information flows that may require permissions.
Limitations: Permission flow approach suffers from the following limita-
tions:
• Permission flow does not handle native code permissions.
• Permission flow records a large number of false positives due to the check-
ing of redundant permissions and data dependent checks.
• Permission flow gives false negatives for the apps that transfer protected
information between components before returning it. This is due to the
use of Implicit intents as it prevents identification of the class names for
invoked Activity.
7.1.7. FUSE [14]
Objective: FUSE proposed a approach that starts by single-app static
analysis accompanied with lint tool followed by multi-app information flow
analysis. Lint tool is used to mitigate limitations of static analysis. They
demonstrated limitations of single-app analysis by detecting more information
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flow paths in multi-app analysis.
Methodology: FUSE works in two broad steps. Single-app analysis,
followed by multi-app analysis based on violation of specified security policies.
The first step takes an appkit (collection of apps) as input, analyze each app
individually to produce extended manifest data structure. In the second step,
all the extended manifests are combined and collusion is checked based on
violation of specified security policies. The detailing of all the steps are as
follow:
Single-app analysis: In this step, each application in the appkit is individu-
ally analyzed to create its corresponding extended manifest data-structure. The
extended manifest represents the internal information flow graph from applica-
tion inputs (sources) to application outputs (sinks). According to FUSE, sources
are the inputs to each component or permission protected resources. Sinks are
the means by which a component can send (possibly sensitive) information to
another component or to the outside world. In FUSE, a version of Andersen’s
analysis [107] is used to compute a call graph and determine reachable methods
in each application. The analysis also considers Android Framework and Java
libraries along with the application. The application is tainted with taint labels
at every source and if these labels reach to sinks, data leakage path is flagged.
Multi-app analysis: In this step, FUSE takes the entire appkit along with
all the extended manifests as input. The output is the multi-app graph with
the flow of information between the applications. In the graph, set of all the
permissions and each sources and sinks present in any application becomes the
node. There must be an edge from source or permission to the sink, whenever
there is the flow of information between them. There also exist the edges from
sink to component, if sink can send IPC message to that component.
FUSE defines coarse-grained information flow assertions based on permis-
sions combination. The multi-app graph is checked against these assertions.
User is alerted if there is any violation of the assertion occurs in the graph.
FUSE also uses security linter tool, to overcome the limitations of static analy-
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sis. The tool issues warning if there exists problem like, component hijacking,
dynamic registration of broadcast receiver, use of insecure credentials, presence
of reflection, unused permissions or writing to public files.
Dataset Used: 189 applications drawn from Nexus 4 running Android
4.4.2. 1124 applications of F-Droid updated till May,2014. 1260 applications
from Genome project dataset, applications from DroidBench.
Limitations: FUSE suffers from following limitations:
• The biggest limitation of the approach is that it is not publicly available
to test. It is designed for commercial purposes.
• Defining coarse-grained information flow assertions leads to many false
alert as the behavior of the application is not considered.
• It does not support all versions Android APIs,
7.1.8. Amandroid [22]
Objective: Amandroid is a static analysis tool, that has the capability of
calculating all objects’ points-to information in a both flow and context-sensitive
way. This tool detects whether there is any information leakage from a sensitive
source to a critical sink; by providing an abstraction of the app’s behavior.
Methodology: Amandroid proceeds by converting an app’s Dalvik byte-
code to an intermediate representation (IR) for subsequent analysis. Then,
Amandroid generates an environment model that emulates the interactions of
the Android System with the app to limit the scope of the analysis for scal-
ability. Amandroid builds an inter-component data flow graph (IDFG) of the
whole app. IDFG includes the control flow graph; that tracks the set of ob-
ject creation sites that reach each program point. The core component is to
build a precise IDFG of the app; the flow-sensitive and context-sensitive data
flow analysis to calculate objects points-to information is done at the same time
with building inter-procedural control flow graph. Amandroid builds the data
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dependence graph on top of the IDFG, then it induces explicit information flow.
This framework provides an abstraction of the app’s behavior, and can be used
for a number of useful security analysis as data leak detection, data injection
detection, and detection misuse of an API.
Dataset used: Amandroid is tested on 753 Google Play apps by the Epicc
group, and 100 potentially malicious apps from Arbor Networks.
Limitations: Amandroid has the following limitations:
• Amandroid has limited capability to handle exceptions. Amandroid may
not detect an exception, when an app has a security issue where the core
of an execption handler plays a role.
• Amandroid does not handle concurrency and reflections. An app may have
multiple components and then may run concurrently; and when multiple
components interleave this may induce some security issues.
7.1.9. Android Taint Flow Analysis for App Sets [108]
Objective: DidFail conducts static taint analysis of Android apps by
augmenting FlowDroid and Epicc tools to detect intra-component and inter-
component information flow in a set of apps. It performs analysis in two phases
where the first phase determines information flow within the app and second
phase determines flow across the apps.
Methodology: DidFail accepts a set of apps as the input. The analysis is
performed in two phases:
• The first phase constitutes of 4 steps - TransformAPK, FlowDroid (mod-
ified), Dare and Epicc.
1. TransformAPK : In this step, each APK is modified by using Soot.
Initially, APK is converted to an intermediate representation known
as jimple. Later, all the send intent method calls are located and just
before the method call, a new method call is inserted that provides
a unique ID to the sent intent. The jimple code is then repackaged
into an APK and passed as an input to the next step.
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2. Dare: This tool accepts transformed APK as an input and produces
retargeted java class files as an output.
3. Epicc: This tool accepts retargeted java class files and transformed
APK as an input and provides parameters of sent and received intents
such as action, category as an output to the second phase.
4. Modified FlowDroid : DidFail has modified FlowDroid by adding few
intent method calls as sources (onActivityResult()) and sinks (setRe-
sult()). It has also added code to analyze putExtra call for the intents
that are uniquely identified by ID in TransformAPK step. FlowDroid
accepts transformed APK as the input and conducts taint analysis.
It provides flows within the components of an app as the output.
• The first phase identifies intents as tuples. For example, I < C1, C2, ID >
where C1 = component that sends the intent, C2 = component that re-
ceives the intent and ID = unique identifier of the intent. This phase
identifies flows within an app and pass these flows as an input to the
second phase.
• In the second phase, inter-app communication among the set of apps is
resolved i.e. an intent sent by an app is matched with the intent-filters of
other apps to identify the receiver. Once the receiver is identified a flow
from source→sink is detected.
Dataset Used: DidFail is tested on two app sets where the first app set
contains three apps developed by the authors and second app set contains three
apps taken from Droidbenchmark.
Limitations: DidFail suffers from the following limitations:
• DidFail does not handle native calls and reflection.
• DidFail focuses only on Activity component of Android app. It does not
handle service, broadcast receiver and content provider.
• DidFail cannot detect flow of information when static fields are used as a
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source or sink for intents i.e. it misses the flow if an intent reads informa-
tion from static field.
• If the tainted information propagates through a chain of apps, then DidFail
fails to detect the flow.
7.1.10. Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in Android: Com-
Droid [10]
Objective: ComDroid is a tool that detects application communication
vulnerabilities and could be used by developers and reviewers to analyze their
own applications before release. The main purpose of this tool comes from
the fact that Android’s message passing system can become an attack if used
incorrectly (personal data loss, information leakage, phishing, etc.) These
vulnerabilities stem mainly from the fact that Intents can be used for both
intra and inter application communication.
Methodology: ComDroid considers two types of analysis: Intent analy-
sis and Component analysis.
In Intent analysis, ComDroid statically analyzes method invocation to a
depth of one method call. In this way it performs flow sensitive intra-procedural
static analysis, with a limited inter-procedural analysis. This tool parses dalvik
files and tracks the state of intents, registers, sinks, intent-filters, and compo-
nents. For each method that uses intents, this tool can track the value of each
string, class, intent and intent-filter. For each Intent object, ComDroid tracks
the following:
• whether the intent has been made explicit;
• whether the intent has an action;
• whether the intent has any flags set; and
• whether the intent has any extra data.
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When it detects that an implicit intent being sent with weak or no permission
requirements, ComDroid issues a warning as this situation is eavesdropping
prone. There are two types of warnings viz. with data, and without data, in
order to distinguish action based attacks from eavesdropping.
In Component analysis, ComDroid examines application’s manifest file to
get components and translates dalvik instructions to get information about each
component. ComDroid treats activities and their aliases as separate components
because an alias field can increase the exposure surface of the component. It
generates a warning about a potential intent spoofing attack, when it detects
that a public component is protected with no permission or a weak permission.
ComDroid also issues warnings for receivers that are registered to receive system
broadcast actions (that are actions sent by the system).
In order to resolve these warnings, a solution proposed by authors was
to add a call to android.content.Intent.getAction() to verify that the
protected action is in the Intent (authentication of the sender of the Intent).
This differs from other Intent spoofing attacks where the solution is to make
the component private.
Limitations: ComDroid suffers from the following limitations:
• False Negatives: ComDroid tracks Intent control flow across functions,
and did not distinguish between paths through if and switch statements.
For instance, an application might make an Intent implicit in one branch
and explicit in another, ComDroid would always identify it as explicit.
• Privilege Delegation: ComDroid does not detect privilege delegation
through pending Intents and Intents that carry URI read/write permis-
sions.
• Verification of the existence of attacks: ComDroid issues warnings and
not verify the existence of attacks. For instance, some components are
intentionally made public for the purpose of inter-application collabora-
tion. It is not possible to infer the developer’s intention when making a
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component public. It is the role of the developer to verify the veracity of
the warnings.
7.2. Dynamic Analysis
This section briefly explains the proposed tools and approaches that conducts
analysis dynamically.
7.2.1. IntelliDroid [109]
Objective: IntelliDroid is a generic tool that generates input specific for
a dynamic analysis tool to perform analysis more precisely by reducing false
positives. Instead of static or dynamic analysis, this work proposes targeted
analysis. It is achieved by preliminarily doing background study about the
dynamic analysis tool and static analysis of the application given as input to
the dynamic analysis tool. It helps in triggering target APIs and consecutively
leads to more efficient and effective dynamic analysis.
Methodology: Android apps contain multiple event handlers, which
when triggered in a particular sequence with specific inputs, reveal malicious
behavior. This environment and input is provided by IntelliDroid to dynamic
analysis tools. IntelliDroid acts in 6 steps viz. Specifying target APIs,
Identifying paths to target APIs, Extracting call path constraints, Extracting
event chains, Determining run-time constraints and Input-injection to trigger
call paths.
In the first step, APIs to be targeted are identified by analyzing either API
methods [2], system calls [110] or low-level events [111].
In the second step, paths to the targeted APIs are discovered by conduct-
ing static analysis. IntelliDroid obtains information about components of an
application and its lifecycle methods by reading its manifest file. It identifies
entry-points of an application and create a partial call-graph to look for ini-
tialization of callback listeners. It adds circumvented listener methods to the
entry-points list and creates a new call graph. This process is repeated re-
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cursively till no more entry points are found. By traversing path from event
handler’s entry point to target API invocation, target paths are extracted for
every target API.
In the third step, call path constraints are determined by conducting control
and data-flow analysis on the control flow graph (CFG) in forward direction.
If more than one path exists from one-method invocation to other in CFG,
IntelliDroid combines the constraints of each path by using logical OR operator.
For the cases where extracted constraints are return values of other method
invocation, they are added with main path constraints by using logical AND
operator.
The reason for executing fourth step (extracting event chains) is that the
path constraints can be heap variables whose value cannot be determined stat-
ically by observing entry-points. To determine their values, the lines in the
code containing the heap variable definition are looked for. The event handler
containing the heap variable definition are tracked and stored. The route from
event handler to heap variable store statement becomes supporting path and its
constraints becomes supporting constraints. Their value is determined at the
time of resolving constraints ans subsequently used for storing path constraints.
In the fifth phase i.e. determining run-time constraints, the value of variables
that are still unresolved are obtained at run-time, just before the event injection.
In the sixth step, finally the input fulfilling constraints are injected to trigger
the call paths. The component of IntelliDroid responsible for injecting input
consists of a computer attached to a device. Communication between them
occurs through IntelliDroidService. The static part of IntelliDroid is responsible
for specifying inputs for the targeted APIs. It supplies these inputs to dynamic
part which is accountable for inserting the inputs at device-framework interface
of Android.
For the static analysis, source code is not used. The APK files are unpacked
using Dare [98] and APKParser [112]. The Java bytecode is then passed to static
part which uses WALA static analysis libraries [113]. For dynamic analysis,
Z3 constraint solver [114] is used. The IntelliDroidService client program is
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executed using Python.
IntelliDroid is tested with TaintDroid, a dynamic analysis tool. On an
average 72 inputs have been injected. Out of 75 malware instances, IntelliDroid
was successful in identifying 70 instances. It is observed that 138.4 seconds on
an averages is required per application.
Dataset Used: It has been tested on 1260 malware samples from Malware
Genome Project [115] and 1066 benign apps from Android Observatory [116].
Limitations: IntelliDroid suffers from the following limitations:
• IntelliDroid does not handle implicit Intents, Content Providers and native
code.
• The extracted constraints are sometimes very complex such as trignomet-
ric functions. It cannot be resolved by constraint solver. Currently, human
intervention is required to solve such constraints.
• IntelliDroid partially handles reflection as it cannot identify the path con-
straints after the reflected call.
• IntelliDroid is not capable of creating inputs for encrypted and hashed
functions.
7.2.2. IntentDroid [117]
Objective: IntentDroid is a framework that dynamically examines
Android apps for IAC (Inter Application Communication) related integrity
vulnerabilities such as custom uri’s, payloads in IAC messages etc. It created
attack scenario for 8 vulnerabilities viz. Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection,
Unsafe Reflections, UI (User-Interface) Spoofing, Fragment Injection, Java
Crashing, Native Memory Corruption and File Manipulation. It analyzes
Activity component of apps by implementing attack scenarios in a way to
obtain effective path coverage with minimum overhead.
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Methodology: IntentDroid tests the applications in three phases viz.
Instrumentation, Testing and Reporting.
In the instrumentation phase, the app under analysis is instrumented to store
library calls and access to user-supplied data. The app is reverse engineered
through apktool to extract its manifest file. Manifest file is parsed to extract
public components. IntentDroid specifies three cases to call any activity as
public:
• if the activity is exported via Intent filter(s);
• if the activity access does not require any permissions (system or signa-
ture); and
• if any unvalidated data which is originated from any public component,
passes through it;
These activities communicate via Intents and therefore all Intents form a set of
IAC input points for the Testing phase.
In the testing phase, to detect whether a vulnerability exists in the app or
not, IntentDroid has created attack scenarios. Testing occurs in three steps
Monitoring, Testing and Exploration. During monitoring, IntentDroid sends
a message to the app under test. It uses system-level hooks to records all
the security concerned APIs called by the app and custom fields (such as
getStringExtra, getFieldExtra, etc.) accessed by it. IntentDroid analyzes
the app with direct and indirect access to custom fields. For direct access, In-
tentDroid iteratively detects the extra fields of the Intent and looks for the be-
havior of the app. If any extra field is observed, that IAC input point migrates
to testing phase. For indirect access, bundle object created for the message
sent by IntentDroid is observed by installing a monitor in Intent.getBundle()
method. It checks the extra and data fields for payloads. If any inserted payload
is found, bundle is considered relevant and exploited further by implementing
attack scenarios. After monitoring the app undergoes testing. The app is tested
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for implementation of an attack scenario on an IAC input point by sending probe
request. If the result is positive, that attack scenario is implemented. In the end
during exploration, boolean variables are analyzed to detect the path followed
by an Intent. It introduces two terminology for boolean variables viz. Indepen-
dence and Dominance. A boolean variable is Independent, if its execution is not
dependent on any other boolean variable. On the contrary, a boolean variable
is Dominating, if its execution decides the application of other boolean variable
(nested variables). Boolean variable analysis reflects the handling of incoming
data by the Intent.
In the Reporting phase, IntentDroid reports the number of vulnerabilities
present in an app after implementing all the possible attack scenarios on the
app.
For evaluating IntentDroid, apps in the test dataset are manually tested
by professional ethical hacker through brute-force fuzzing tool. It detected
163 IAC vulnerabilities across 80 apps. IntentDroid is able to detect 150 IAC
vulnerabilities giving a recall rate of 92%.
Dataset Used: IntentDroid is tested on the dataset of 80 apps, out of
which 4 are enterprise apps, 4 are shipping apps and remaining 73 are the
most popular Google Play apps. These apps are tested on Samsung Nexus 5
device with Android 4.4 installed on it.
Limitation: IntentDroid suffers from the following limitations:
• IntentDroid does not test Services, Broadcast Receivers and Content
Providers for IAC vulnerabilities.
• IntentDroid does not consider multi-app attack.
7.2.3. TaintDroid [2]
Objective: TaintDroid is a security framework that dynamically detects
sensitive information leakage in ICC between Android apps. TaintDroid
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extends the functionality of Android operating system to record the flow of
confidential and vulnerable data through installed applications.
Methodology: It combines four fragments of taint dispersion viz. Vari-
able Level, Message Level, Method Level and File Level. Variable level
capturing is done for single app analysis. Variable taint tags are stored
adjacently to variables in memory. Message level capturing is done for tracking
communication between applications. One taint tag per message is stored
which is the combination of variable taint tags. Method level capturing is done
for native libraries granted by system. File level capturing is done to guarantee
data preserves their taint markings. One taint tag per file is stored.
TaintDroid divides the Android architecture in three modules viz. Inter-
preted Code, Userspace and Kernel. It considers a scenario in which a message
is transmitted from source app to destination app, where source app is assumed
to be trusted and destination app is assumed to be untrusted.
Interpreted code module of the source app taints (labels) the data originated
from confidential and vulnerable sources (such as GPS coordinates) as taint
sources in a trusted application. The assigned taint labels are stored in Virtual
Taint Map present in Userspace module.
Userspace module includes Dalvik VM interpreter (which is invoked by na-
tive methods) and Binder IPC library. TaintDroid modifies Binder IPC library
so that in case of an ICC, the parcel transmitted between two apps carries a
taint tag which is a combination of taint markings of all the data carried in-
side the parcel. The customized Android platform tracks the flow of tainted
data through dynamic taint tracking. In dynamic taint tracking, the labels
are assigned transitively to components (such as IPC messages, variables etc.)
when sensitive information propagates through them. When the tainted data
of trusted app is to be sent as an ICC message, the data is first transferred to
modified Binder IPC library. It creates a parcel and ensures that parcel holds a
tainted tag, representing the combination of all the tainted data tags inside the
parcel. The parcel is sent to untrusted application via Kernel.
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On the receiver side, modified Binder IPC library extracts the data from
the parcel and sends it to Dalvik VM Interpreter. The flow of tainted data
is monitored. Whenever tainted data leaves the system either by transmission
over the network or by any tainted sink, the scenario is logged and reported to
the user immediate. The logged information includes labels of data, receiver of
the data and the application culpable for sending the data.
TaintDroid reported that on an average two-third of the considered apps
are leaking sensitive data. TaintDroid incurs 14% of performance overhead on
CPU-bound micro-benchmark.
Dataset Used: 30 most popular android apps are selected from 12
categories of Android Market. By applying TaintDroid, 65 scenarios of
information misuse across 20 apps has been identified. Out of 1130 logged
TCP connections, 105 has been found responsible for carrying tainted data out
of the system. 15 out of 30 apps have been found leaking user’s location to
advertising servers. 7 applications have been detected leaking user’s device ID.
Limitations: TaintDroid suffers from the following limitations:
• TaintDroid only handles data flows. It does not considers control flows.
• TaintDroid is not able to tag native code which leaves many sensitive
sources untouched.
• In case of File level tracking, storing one taint tag per file gives a lot of
false positives.
7.3. Policy Enforcement Based Analysis
7.3.1. Collusive Data Leak and More: Large Scale Threat Analysis of Inter-app
Communications[118]
Objective: The paper presents a tool named DIALDroid (Database
powered ICC Analysis for Android). To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first state-of-art that proposed large scale detection of collusion and privilege
53
escalation. They also provide the first inter-app collusion real-apps benchmark
of 30 apps. Till now, this is the most efficient tool available in the literature
for inter-app vulnerability detection [17].
Methodology: In this paper, authors proposed DIALDroid that works
in four broad steps. In the first step, permissions and intent-filter attributes
are extracted from the manifest file and ICC entry/exit points are identified.
In the second step, static taint analysis is performed to determine paths from
sensitive sources to the intents being sent and intents received to sensitive
sinks. It leverages Flowdroid[73] to conduct dataflow analysis at high precision.
In the third step, all the extracted data is organized in mysql database
comprising of 42 tables. The relational database provides scalable and efficient
storage. To reduce the computational complexities, DIALDroid filters out
ICC communications that are not sensitive. Finally, security policies are
implemented using sql queries to detect the presence of collusion or privilege
escalation.
They improved the preciseness of intent discovery by implementing in-
cremental callback analysis. In dataflow analyzer, if any app takes more
than 5 minutes, DIALDroid resets the analysis by decreasing precision to
maintain the trade-off between performance and precision. To avoid deadlocks,
the app is analyzed for maximum 20 minutes. The crash rate of DIALDroid
is very less than IccTA+APKCombiner [15] and it is more accurate than [15, 30].
Dataset Used: The dataset consists of 110,150 apps which includes
100,206 most popular Google play apps and 9,944 apps from Virushare.
DIALDroid is also analyzed on Droidbench apps and ICC bench apps.
Limitations: DIALDroid suffers from the following limitations:
• DIALDroid resolves reflective calls only if their argument are string con-
stants, which is not always the case.
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• DIALDroid analyzes an app only for 20 minutes. If an app takes more
than that time, DIALDroid stops analysis.
• DIALDroid can handle intent based ICC communications only. Therefore,
security risks posed by other inter-app channels like content providers,
shared preferences etc. cannot be detected.
7.3.2. Intersection Automata based Model for Android Application Collu-
sion [20]
Objective: This is a static inter app analysis tool that can take multiple
apps simultaneously for analysis and detect potentially colluding apps.
Methodology: In this paper, authors proposed a novel automaton framework
that allows detection of intent based collusion among apps. The presence of col-
lusion is detected by intersecting application and policy automata. Application
automaton depicts intent-based communication among apps. Policy automaton
have policies like if access of an API that requires READ SMS permission in one
app is followed by an API call that requires SEND SMS permission in another
app. The policy is searched in the application automaton and if the match is
found, the tool will check the presence of READ SMS permission in the second
app. If it is not found then the tool declares the presence of collusion otherwise
no collusion.
The detection framework operates at the component-level. They tested
their approach on 21 apps by taking all possible combinations (two at a time)
and successfully detected presence/absence of collusion among them. Time and
space complexity of the proposed tool is O(n) where n is the sum of all the
components in applications under analysis.
Dataset Used: 3 applications from DroidBench inter-app communication cat-
egory, self-developed 14 applications and 4 applications from Google Play Store.
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Limitations: The tool suffers from the following limitations:
• The false alarm rate is very high as the tool is not performing any data-
flow analysis. If there is intent communication between two apps without
any data transferred, the tool raise warning of collusion.
• Only intents are considered as a means of communication.
7.3.3. Flexible and Fine-Grained Mandatory Access Control on Android for Di-
verse Security and Privacy Policies [94]
Objective: FlaskDroid is policy-driven tool that provides security for
kernel resources (like files, IPC, etc.) as well as middleware resources (like
Intents, Content Providers, etc.). The security enforcement is through pro-
viding mandatory access control on both middleware and kernel layers of
Android simultaneously. They extended Android’s middleware layer with type
enforcement and present a new policy language to capture the semantics of this
layer.
Methodology: FlaskDroid plants various Object Managers at middle-
ware and kernel layer that are responsible for assigning security context to
objects. Related policies are managed by security servers deployed at different
layers. The object manager makes access control decisions by using security
servers at their respective layer. Also the deployed policies at both the layers
are synchronized meaning change of policy in one layers, automatically reflect
in another layer. Following are the major components of FlaskDroid:
• SE Android Module: SE Android module restricts the privileges of root
account to constrain the file-system privileges of the app. It is also respon-
sible for restricting apps from bypassing middleware level policy enforce-
ment check. For e.g., it restricts app from directly accessing the contacts
database file instead, the app must access contacts via ContactsProvider
app.
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• Userspace Security Server: It is responsible for taking policy decisions for
all userspace access control.
• Userspace Object Managers: In FlaskDroid, middleware services and apps
act as Userspace Object Managers (USOMs) for their re- spective objects.
Currently it comprises of 136 policy enforcement points.
• Context Providers: A context is the current security requirements of the
device. It is derived from various criteria, such as physical, the state of
apps and the system. Context Providers are the plugins to Userspace
Security Server that allows control of contexts and their definitions.
Dataset Used: FlaskDroid is evaluated on the apps collected from Malware
Genome [119] and Contagio minidump [120]. The authors also developed
synthetic apps that exhibits root exploit, over-privilege, information leakage,
sensory malwares, confused deputy and collusion attacks.
Limitations: FlaskDroid suffers from the following limitations:
• Access control rules are human user trail based. Therefore, revision of rules
is time-comsuming process. Also, limited human trials cannot guarantee
full coverage of possible access control rules.
• Many false alarms while detecting confused deputy and collusion attacks.
As FlaskDroid relies on application inputs/outputs and does not consider
the information flow within apps.
• Simultaneous analysis of multipe apps is not provided by FlaskDroid.
7.3.4. XManDroid: A New Android Evolution to Mitigate Privilege Escalation
Attacks [26]
Objective: XmanDroid (eXtended Monitoring on Android) is a dynamic
framework that extends the monitoring mechanism of Android to detect and
prevent application-level privilege escalation attacks. It is based on runtime
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system-centric policies. Two types of application-level privilege escalation
attacks are handled by XmanDroid viz. Confused Deputy attacks and Colluding
attacks.
Dataset Used: XManDroid developed their own dataset that consists
of seven apps. These app set exhibit privilege escalation attack through ICC
communication links and three types of covert channels viz. synchronized
adjustment and reading of the voice volume, change of the screen state and
change of the vibration settings.
Methodology: XManDroid consists of three elements:
• Application Installer: It is responsible for installation and uninstallation
of applications. It makes use of package manager for incorporating the
changes and rebuild a new state, whenever any new application gets in-
stalled.
• System Policy Installer: It is responsible for the installation of explicitly
defined list of system policies in the Android middleware.
• Runtime Monitor: It is responsible for enforcing mandatory access con-
trol in Android like permissions are checked at this interface, take deci-
sions whether to allow an ICC or not based on the information about
installed apps and their communication. Whenever a request for an ICC
call reaches, it is either approved or disapproved by reference monitor after
validating it with policies database and whether the given ICC call leads
to privacy leak or not.
System representation is done using graph schema where UID assigned by
the system to an app is a vertex and the information about exchanged intents
are the edges. By applying the rules of graph theory, transitive transfer of
information is detected during ICC. This graph is used for defining rules in
system policies.
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Dataset Used: XManDroid developed their own dataset that consists
of seven apps. These app set exhibit privilege escalation attack through ICC
communication links and three types of covert channels viz. synchronized
adjustment and reading of the voice volume, change of the screen state and
change of the vibration settings.
Limitations: XmanDroid suffers from the following limitations:
• False Positives: XManDroid suffers from high positives if the app un-
der analysis is over-privileged. The defined system-policies are not tuned
properly.
• Attack at kernel level: XManDroid cannot handle privilege escalation at-
tacks done at kernel level that can exploit the system to gain root access.
• Single app analysis is missing: XManDroid cannot detect malicious app
as applications within a single sandbox have equal privileges and cannot
perform privilege escalation.
7.4. Case Studies
This section presents various studies done to demonstrate the serious effects
of information leakage in android apps.
7.4.1. Case of Collusion: A Study of the Interface Between Ad Libraries and
their Apps [121]
Objective: In this study, API calls used by Ad Libraries to communicate
with host applications are analyzed. Host applications have access to sensitive
and private user data. API calls are capable of transmitting demographic data
about user, which is of great interest for Ad agencies. Therefore, this interface
presents a serious impact of user’s private information leakage.
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Methodology: Initially, manual identification of 103 individual and an-
alytic libraries are done. Then, apps are disassembled using dedexer [122]
followed by app parsing, to detect all the API calls (using package name) that
occurred between apps and any ad library. Later, all the captured API calls are
recorded to keep a track of calls which were actually used from the considered
dataset. Frequency of each call is also calculated and recorded. The group of
detected API calls are assembled to recreate API of Ad libraries. Recreation is
followed by detection of privacy related API calls through manually examining
each API call using method name and parameters. The study found that user
private data is leaked and stored in databases. These demographic data can be
correlated to map a user to a real world person.
Dataset Used: Dataset consists of 114,000 apps downloaded from Google
Play Store. APIs of 103 ad libraries used by apps in the dataset are recon-
structed. Top 20 ad libraries used in 64000 applications have been analyzed to
detect privacy leakage.
Limitations: The study suffers from following limitations:
• The study only considers API calls. API calls are not the only source
of communication between ad libraries and apps. Communication can
also be performed through direct manipulation of class variables, shared
memory etc.
• In case of obfuscation, where method names are altered, this method is
not capable of identifying privacy related API calls.
• The libraries which acts as a intermediate to transfer information between
an app and its library are known as Ad mediation libraries. They are not
considered in this study.
• It also omits small libraries which can also be a source of privacy leakage.
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7.4.2. Analysis of communication between colluding applications [27]
Objective: This paper focuses on evaluating two major channels used for
collusion named covert and overt channels. This work aims to quantify the
severity of app collusion attack threats by computing throughput, bit-error
rate and expected synchronization for every channel.
Methodology: Covert and overt channels are implemented by executing
them on Nexus one or Samsung Galaxy S smartphones. 5 overt channels
are implemented viz. Shared Preferences, Internal Storage, Broadcast In-
tents, System Logs and UNIX Socket communication. 9 covert channels
are implemented which viz. Single and Multiple Settings, Types of Intents,
Automatic Intents, Threads Enumeration, UNIX Socket discovery, Free Space
on file system, Reading /proc/stat, Timing Channels and Processor Frequency.
Experiments are performed to calculate throughput (rate of transmitting data
through a channel), stealth (difficulty in identifying a channel), bit-error rate
(error-occurance rate in transmission) and required synchronization (timing
constraint between source and sink). In tests 4, 8 and 135 byte data is
transmitted from source to sink. During transmission, if the channel under
consideration is found open, the information is logged. For the channels which
requires synchronization between source and sink, a synchronization protocol is
applied on them. This protocol reduces noise and starts measurement on both
the ends at the same time.
This paper also proposes a collusion detection approach named Black-Box
analysis technique. This technique administers a data monitor between
applications on the device. The monitor tracks and stores the data used and
transmitted by an app to the colluding app. The paper claims that the existing
analysis tools such as TaintDroid and XmanDroid failed to detect most of these
channels. TaintDroid detects only 2 out of 5 overt channels and 0 out of 9
covert channels. XmanDroid detects 4 out of 5 overt channels and 6 out of 9
covert channels.
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Limitations: The approach suffers from the following limitations:
• The proposed black-box approach is very preliminary, it misses many com-
munications.
• Data monitoring cannot handle obfuscation, reflection and encryption.
• It cannot handle complex string analysis that can be used by any of the
channels.
7.5. Comparison among state of art approaches
Researchers have proposed various approaches for intra and inter-app analy-
sis varying from static [62][73], dynamic [79] to policy enforcement [9][91] based
techniques. In Section 6, we explained these techniques and Section 7 presents
research pieces that rely on these techniques. Table 1 summarizes each proposed
approach under different criteria: (1) handled components, (2) handled Intents,
(3) examines native code or not, (4) resolves reflection or not, (5) works on
which code level, (6) conducts intra or inter app analysis and (7) availability of
the tool. We believe this helps the reader to examine all the differences in one
glance.
Most of the proposed approaches handle Android components viz. Activi-
ties(A), Services(S) and Receivers(R), whereas, Content Providers(C) are not
handled by [10, 20, 22, 32, 100, 109] as shown in column (1) of the table.
These approaches consider only Intents as a medium of communication. To
access content providers, unique resource identifier (URI) does not use the In-
tent. Therefore, Intent specific approaches fails to handle content providers. In
particular, there are two approaches [108] and [123] that are not handling any
components other than activities. In [108], the authors have mentioned that
their approach can be similarly extended for other components whereas [123]
have built a prototype on activities and it is available commercially as a cloud
service. In future the authors of [123] may extend their approaches to handle
all the other components.
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There are broadly two types of Intents viz. Implicit(I) and Explicit(E). All
the proposed approaches can handle communication through Intents as they are
the most popular medium of communication used in Android as shown in column
(2) of the table. Although there is one approach [109] that is not considering
implicit Intent. The reason narrated by the authors of [109] is that they do
not want to increase false positives. In case of implicit Intent the target is not
fixed. If there are multiple receivers then at the run-time one of the receivers is
chosen.
Column (3) of table 1 presents the capability of proposed approaches to han-
dle native code. Native code refers to the code written in C/C++ and used by
Android app libraries for low-level interactions with the underlying Linux ker-
nel. Native code runs directly on the processor and hence not included in Dalvik
executable that runs in Dalvik virtual machine. Almost all the approaches con-
vert dex into some intermediate representation (IR) language but native code is
not get converted into IR and hence, cannot be handled by many tools. How-
ever, Flowdroid [73] can handle very limited native calls as they defined some
explicit rules for common invocation of native calls present in Java. Tools like
[15, 18, 108] leverage Flowdroid for analysis and therefore can handle native
calls partially.
The proposed approaches based on the their ability to resolve reflection is
depicted in column (4) of the table. Reflection is a language’s ability to in-
spect and dynamically call classes, methods, attributes, etc. at runtime. It is
a dynamic phenomenon and hence it is very difficult for any static approach to
handle it. Dynamic analysis approaches are needed to capture related runtime
behaviour features to resolve reflection. If an API is called through reflection,
it is passed as a parameter and hence become invisible for detection tools. Al-
though some static tools like [14, 15, 18] can handle reflection partially meaning
if the API calls are string constants, then they may be revealed otherwise if
they are called through variable where it is obfuscated or encrypted, these tools
cannot resolve such reflected calls.
Analysis tools based on the used intermediate representation (IR) for anal-
63
P
ro
p
o
se
d
A
p
p
ro
a
ch
es
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
In
te
n
ts
N
a
ti
v
e
R
efl
ec
ti
o
n
C
o
d
e
In
te
r-
a
p
p
A
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
H
a
n
d
le
d
H
a
n
d
le
d
C
o
d
e
(4
)
L
ev
el
A
n
a
ly
si
s
(7
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(5
)
(6
)
Static
M
R
-D
ro
id
[1
7
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
Y
es
-
D
et
ec
ti
n
g
In
te
r-
A
p
p
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
L
ea
k
a
g
e
P
a
th
s
[3
2
]
〈A
S
R
-〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
&
S
m
a
li
Y
es
-
T
o
w
a
rd
s
A
u
to
m
a
te
d
A
n
-
d
ro
id
A
p
p
C
o
ll
u
si
o
n
D
e-
te
ct
io
n
[1
0
0
]
〈A
S
R
-〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
S
m
a
li
Y
es
-
IC
C
M
a
p
[4
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
J
im
p
le
/
S
o
u
rc
e
co
d
e
Y
es
-
Ic
cT
A
[1
5
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
Y
es
*
Y
es
*
J
im
p
le
Y
es
+
O
p
en
-S
o
u
rc
e
P
er
m
is
si
o
n
F
lo
w
[1
3
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
N
o
-
F
U
S
E
[1
4
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
Y
es
*
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
Y
es
C
o
m
m
er
ci
a
l
A
m
a
n
D
ro
id
[2
2
]
〈A
S
R
-
〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
N
o
O
p
en
-S
o
u
rc
e
D
id
F
a
il
[1
0
8
]
〈A
-
-
-〉
〈E
I〉
Y
es
*
N
o
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
Y
es
O
p
en
-S
o
u
rc
e
C
o
m
D
ro
id
[1
0
]
〈A
S
R
-
〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
N
o
O
p
en
-S
o
u
rc
e
Dynamic
In
te
ll
iD
ro
id
[1
0
9
]
〈A
S
R
-〉
〈E
-〉
Y
es
Y
es
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
N
o
-
In
te
n
tD
ro
id
[1
1
7
]
〈A
-
-
-〉
〈E
I〉
Y
es
Y
es
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
Y
es
C
o
m
m
er
ci
a
l
T
a
in
tD
ro
id
[2
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
Y
es
Y
es
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
N
o
O
p
en
-S
o
u
rc
e
PolicyEnforcement
D
IA
L
D
ro
id
[1
8
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
Y
es
*
Y
es
*
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
Y
es
O
p
en
-S
o
u
rc
e
In
te
rs
ec
ti
o
n
A
u
to
m
a
ta
B
a
se
d
M
o
d
el
fo
r
A
n
-
d
ro
id
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
C
o
ll
u
si
o
n
[2
0
]
〈A
S
R
-〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
J
a
v
a
B
y
te
co
d
e
Y
es
-
F
la
sk
D
ro
id
[9
4
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
N
o
N
o
-
Y
es
-
X
M
a
n
D
ro
id
[2
6
]
〈A
S
R
C
〉
〈E
I〉
Y
es
Y
es
-
Y
es
-
•
A
:
A
ct
iv
it
y,
S
:
S
er
v
ic
e,
R
:
B
ro
a
d
ca
st
R
ec
ei
v
er
,
C
:
C
o
n
te
n
t
P
ro
v
id
er
•
E
:
E
x
p
li
ci
t
In
te
n
t,
I:
Im
p
li
ci
t
In
te
n
t
•
Y
es
*
:
T
h
e
d
et
a
il
s
a
re
ex
p
la
in
ed
in
se
ct
io
n
7
.5
•
Y
es
+
:
If
it
is
u
se
d
w
it
h
A
P
K
C
o
m
b
in
er
T
a
b
le
1
:
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
a
m
o
n
g
st
a
te
o
f
th
e
a
rt
a
p
p
ro
a
ch
es
64
Figure 3: Intermediate Representation (IR) used for analysis
ysis are classified in column (5) of the table. Android APK file is converted to
some IR prior to the analysis. There are four code levels on which analysis can
be performed viz. Java source code, Java bytecode, Jimple and Smali. Java
source code can be analyzed because applications are written in Java language.
However, souce is available only if the apps are open-sourced or self developed.
Android apps are compiled into Dalvik bytecode called Dex, which is executed
in Dalvik virtual machine. For analysis Dalvik should be converted to Java
bytecode. This can be done by many APK to Jar converters like dex2jar [124],
ded [125] and Dare [98]. Jimple is a simplified version of Java bytecode. It is a
typed 3-address intermediate representation. It is used by Soot [104] which is
a popular static analysis framework for Java. Dexpler [126] is a plugin for the
Soot framework that translates Dalvik bytecode to Jimple. Smali is another IR
used by very popular reverse engineering tool developed by Google named Apk-
tool [106]. Figure 3 shows that Java bytecode is used by most of the approaches,
as Java source is generally not available and Jimple and Smali are tool specific
representations.
Apart from this, Figure 4, shows the distribution of different app repositories
used by the state of art approaches.
This brings us to the following conclusions:
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Figure 4: App repositories used for analysis
• Intents are considered to be most commonly used ICC communication
channels. Therefore data sharing through Content Providers may become
an attractive target for attacker to exploit.
• Native Calls and Reflection are handled by very few researchers and there-
fore can be used by malware developers to evade the maliciousness of their
code.
• There are two ways to register Broadcast Receiver viz. static and dynamic.
If any static approach that cannot handle reflection but can handle dy-
namic Broadcast Receiver only works if, registration of Receiver is not
reflected.
• Most of the approaches work on bytecode and therefore maliciousness
posed by native code remains untouched.
• Approaches that analyzes only single app cannot detect inter app leakages.
7.6. Lessons Learned
In this subsection, we mention some recommendations on which future re-
search needs to focus to stay ahead of smart malware or vulnerabilities.
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Analysis approaches should be combination of static, dynamic and policy
based analysis techniques to overcome the limitations of all. Other communica-
tion channels like Content Providers, Shared Preferences, AIDL etc. should be
considered while analysis. Analysis methods should cover different code forms
to compensate the losses posed by converting dex to any IR language. Also,
analysis methods should consider native code level. There is an urgent need
to develop engines that can resolve reflected calls beforehand, so that they are
examined during analysis. To capture compositional vulnerabilities like collu-
sion, analysis approaches should examine multiple apps simultaneously. Many
proposed approaches are either commercial or not available for public use. It
is very difficult for the researchers to evaluate and compare their findings and
results. Therefore, it is highly recommended that the tool implemented from
the proposed approach along with the tested dataset (if self developed) should
be available for free.
To prevent unintentional collusion i.e. to avoid the situations when some
malicious app can exploit the benign app and use it for collusion, developers
need to take special care while signing applications with same certificate and
keep their certificate private. Developers should also protect the component that
is sending sensitive information to the outside world with specific permissions.
8. Conclusions
Android is a modern operating system for smartphones with expanding mar-
ket share. The main security mechanisms of Android are application sandbox-
ing, application signing, and a permission framework to control access to (sen-
sitive) resources. Android’s security framework exhibits serious shortcomings:
The burden of approving application permissions is delegated to the end-user
who in general does not care much about the impact of prompted permissions
on his privacy and security. Hence, malware can be installed on end-user de-
vices such as unauthorized sending of text messages or leaking of sensitive data
in the background of running games. With the growing use of Android and
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the awareness of its security vulnerabilities, a number of research contributions
have led to tools for the intra-app analysis of Android apps. Unfortunately,
these state of the art approaches, and the associated tools, have long left out
the security flaws that arise across the boundaries of single apps, in the interac-
tion between several apps. We provide in this survey a definition of the collusion
in Android, the major security risks on Android, as well as a summary of the
main tools for detecting inter and intra app analysis. The collusion attack is
worth investigation.
This survey provides a comprehensive assessment of the strengths and short-
comings of state-of-art approaches. It provides a platform to researchers and
practitioners towards proposing technique that can analyze multiple apps simul-
taneously to detect Android app collusion attacks.
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